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ECONOMTC CHANGE IN PONDOLAND IN m NINE- CENTURY 
by 
William Beinart 
In the course of my research on peasantization and stratification in Poncloland 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of problems arose 
concerning the nature of the Mpondo economy in the earlier part of the nineteenth 
century. (1) By the turn of the century the people in Pondoland. were deeply enmeshed in 
the wider South African economy. Technological innovations had led to greater 
concentration on cmp, especially maize, production, which became the mainstay of local 
producers in the decades after the Rinderpest epidemic (1897) and East Coast Fever 
( 1 1 2 1 )  Settled white traders provided the channel for exports and for the 
importation of an increasing variety of manufactured goods. However, while some picture 
begin to emerge of how production had changed during this period, it became increasingly 
difficult to characterize the "traditional" econony. Anthropological works on the Nguni 
have tended to lack a systematic chronological dimension to their analysis of change in 
pre-annexation economies in South Africa. (2) Herding and cultivating were, as these 
works show, the major bases of subsistence, with hunting and gathering supplementing the 
diet. Evidence from nineteenth century sources, however, suggests that the relative 
importance of these activities changed considerably, and that these changes had 
important implications for the organization of the Mpondo chiefdom. This paper is an 
initial attempt to come to terns with information gleaned from an incomplete and rather 
hasty reading of available nineteenth century material. ( 3 )  It will be divided into two 
parts: firstly, an analysis of economic change in Pondoland from the end of the Zulu 
raids (0.1830) to the 1880s, and an examination of the stages by which the Mpondo became 
incorporated into the colonial economy will be presented; secondly, some suggestions 
will be made about the changing control of economic resources during this period. 
The second major Zulu raid to the south in 1828 left the Mpondo in a desperate 
position. Faku, the Mpondo paramount, when questioned by the first colonial official to 
visit the area ten days after the Zulu impis had left, bewailed the fact that "his 
people had lost all their cattle and had nothing to live upon or make clothes of". (4) 
Their huts and grain stores had been destroyed. Faku and his people had been driven 
from their position on the eastern side of the Mzimvubu river and forced to seek refuge 
in the deep river valleys to the west. The continued need for defence, not only against 
the threat of further Zulu raids but also against the newly arrived "Fetkanie" raiding 
chiefdoms, the Baca and the Qyabe, led to concentrated settlement around Fakuts new 
kraal on the Great Mngazi, and to a lesser extent in the Little Mngazi and western 
Mzimvubu valleys. (5) Early missionary visitors expressed amazement on arrival in 
Pondoland . 
From one hill near the Great Place . . . [shepatone, in 1830.1 
counted a hundred kraals each of which contained from twenty 
to forty houses, which, after the usual manner of counting 
in this coun-try, will give more than ten thousand 
inhabitants; and the view from the hil!. only took in 
the population of one river, and the parts adjoining. (6) 
The pattern of settlement remained the same for at least a decade. (7) The kraals were 
"larger" and "much more thickly scatteredqt han those of 
the other races of Kaffers nearer the Colony, who being 
from their vicinage to the colonial boundary much more 
safe from predatory attacks, love to man at large with 
their herds, over extensive tracts of country. (8) 
i The absence of cattle was crucial in enabling the Mpondo to maintain close 
1 settlement; they had no need for pazing lands. But hi& concentration and cattle 
l losses created severe problems of subsistence. Although some initially survived by 
I gathering roots and wild fruit, the Mpondo soon adapted to their condition by exploiting 
the resources of the well-watered valleys in which they had settled and becoming more l 
assiduous cultivators. The majority were settled towards the coast from Fa;kuqs kraal 
I (about 18 miles inland) in areas which were perhaps more suited to gardens than cattle 
l 
l because of the sourness of the veld. ( 9 )  They were fortunate in occupying what most 
observers considered one of the most fertile parts of South Africa: 
l 
The soil is rioh, especially on the flats near the 
margins of the river, and along the hillsides, where 
the Caffers cultivate pumpkins, melons, a srnall 
l 
species of millet called Caffer corn, and maize or 
Indian corn, which grows to an unusual hei&t. (10) l 
Two crops of maize could be produced annually, and, in contrast to the chiefdoms to the 
south and south-west, the men participated in agriculture long before the introduction 
of the plough. (11) At this time, wooden digging spades were used in cultivation. The 
Ypondo certainly worked iron, and, according to tradition, also smelted ore. (12) 
However, they seem to have used their supplies almost exclusively for assegais. Hard 
woods, particularly sneezewood, were locally available and the alluvial soils were 
easily worked. The temporary replacement of cattle by grain for bridewealth must also 
have stimulated production. 
Despite their adaptation to cattle losses, it seems to have been a major aim 
of the Mpondo to regain their herds. 'Trading their surplus was one of the alternatives 
open, The lack of institutionalized markets or trading caravans has led to a neglect, in 
academic work, of inter-chiefdom exchaage among: the "Cape N g w d f l ,  but numerous examples 
emerge from the 19th century sources. Surplus crops were probably a major item of exchange. 
Fako's country may be considered the Granary of the 
eastern parts of Caffreland as they, the Amapondo, 
annually supply the inhabitants with seat quantities 
of Maize asld Caffrecorn for which they receive in 
return hides, beads and cattle. (13) 
Raiding was at least as important in the reaccumulation of cattle. Although 
there was widespread inter-chiefdom raiding south of the Mz;.hkuI-U in the Mfecane period, 
the Mpondo were the only chiefdom to lose their cattle permanently to the Zulu. Thus 
cattle stocks to the south and south-west were still hi&. Although Faku did not adopt 
the Zulu style of a- organization, he had one of the strongest armies in the area. The 
pattern of raiding a d  alliances during the 1830s was complex, but it appears that after 
defeating the Qwabe, Faku forged an alliance, albeit a troubled one, with his only 
remaining rival, Ncapayi (chief of the ~aca), in 1832. (14) At that time, the Baca 
"never ploughedft and were dependent on cattle and their spoils from raiding for 
subsistence. (15) They used Mpondo territory as a base for operations, and Ncapayi 
became tributary to Faku, perhaps receiving grain from the Mpondo between raids. By the 
1830s some observers identified the two chiefs as primarily raiders; they joined forces 
in a series of raids on the Thembu, Mpondomise and Bomvana. (16) 
l Hwnting provided a major source of meat during the 1830s, as well as 
important articles for trade. 
Gasle is abundant; and since the spoil of the i r  flocks 
by the i r  conquerors, has mainly supplied them [the 
~%por].d.o] with food and enabled them to collect fresh 
herds from the i r  westerly neigbbous by the sale  of 
antelope skins, especially those of the blue buck, the 
, a favomite and costly ornament, used 
fo r  the head dxess of the Caffer belles. (17) 
The perjod up to  the 1840s saw the hei&t of the ivory trade i n  the area. Elephants 
were common i n  the forests  of the r iver  valleys, especially i n  the then very sparsely 
i&abfted area t o  the east of the Nzimvubu, from which the Mpondo had retreated i n  
the 1820s. (18) h e  (unreliable) source claims that the Ffpondo had the reputation of 
being the greatest elephant hunters i n  ~eouth 'east Africa i n  the early nineteenth 
century. (19) Henry Fym, one of %he ear l ies t  ivory traders t o  v i s i t  the east  coast, 
spent considerable time i n  Mpondo ter r i tory  and s e t  up a depot near the Mzimvubu; he 
seezns to  have regarded Pondoland as  a t  l eas t  as f ru i t fu l  a source of supply as 
Z u h l a n d ,  (20) Bain, in 1829, collected 2,500 lbs i n  three days from a small group 
se t t led  near the Mzirmrubu. (21) However, although it is clear  that  the Mpondo and 
the i r  t r ibutaries  did hunt elephant, they also acted as midalemen f o r  a number of 
QrBushmenv hunters. One such group was se t t led  on the Mzimvubu. 
They usually roam about between that  r iver  and Matal, 
shooting elephants, the f lesh of which they eat ,  and 
exchange the ivory with Fakurs people f o r  corn and 
tobacco. (22) 
Tkis may have been the same group that Bain had seen a couple of years before, who 
"subsist entirely by huntingtf. (23) By the mid-1830s the Kpondo possibly trailed 
ivory with the Elangwini, under Fodo, who were se t t led  to the east OS the M z M u ,  Eend 
weresometimes called "Bushmen" because they used poisoned a r r o w s  i n  the i r  hunting. (24) 
Ivory was used f o r  ornamental purposes by the Mpondo, but they appear to  have traded 
much of the i r  supply. Bain was asked fo r  ca t t l e  i n  exchange f o r  ivory (five cows f o r  
a tusk i n  18295, but beads were accepted i n  t h e i r  place. No doubt these could be 
exchanged f o r  ca t t l e  from the be t te r  stocked chiefdoms. Ivory had probably been an 
iterp i n  trade, both to  the north and towards the colony, f o r  man;y years before, but 
the trade did not l a s t  beyond the 1840s. F a h  s t i l l  had tusks on tap to present to 
coEovLial of f ic ia ls  i n  the 1 8 5 0 ~ ~  but by 1860 elephants had probably been 
externhated. (25) The ivory trade provided the first contact with white traders and 
was responsible f o r  introducing a few manufactured ar t ic les ,  m d  especially many 
beads, into the area. But the trade did not provide the basis fo r  a las t ing  involvement 
with the colonial economy; the traders were a l l  i t inerant.  
In 1838, F a h  moved back t o  the Eastern Pondoland with a large number of 
h i s  people. ( 2 6 )  He was M e d i a t e @  motivated by the desire to  lay claim to  h is  
terr i tory,  which was threatened by trekker expansion from Natal and. had been assigned 
by D i m e  to  the trekkers. The threat of raids from the north had passed. However, 
the desire to  move was probably closely linked t o  the reacquisition of cat t le .  A 
gradual movement of sub-chiefs to  the grazing land across the MZimvubu appears t o  have 
already begun. The Mpondo settlement pattern slowly took on a more " t~ r~ , i ca l "  N p i  
appearance, a l t h o w  kraals probably remained larger than those of the Xhosa. From 
the l840s, grain exports are not mentioned. While th i s  i s  by no means conclusive 
evidence i n  i t s e l f ,  the immediate incentive to  produce large surpluses had probably 
passed, Annual surpluses were still likely; some safeguard against the possibility 
of droikght or  locust plagues was necessary, although the N$ondo we- able 
to  put even', plagues to  good use - according to  Gardiner, they relished gr i l led  
locuats, )(27) Intexechiefdom exchange was unlikely to  have ceased completely: droughts 
affected the Tmskeian  area unevenly, and throughout the nineteenth century it appears 
that  the less  affected areas i n  a particular year would supply grain to  those badly h i t .  
Colonial of f ic ia ls ,  and historians, l i ke  to date the recovery of the Npondo 
to  the early 18408, when the Cape agreed by t r e a w  t o  protect Pondoland from 
encroachment; by colonial subjects a;nd guaranteed Fakuts authority over an area f a r  
gxeater than he actually controlled. Brownlee's interpretation is %ypical. 
Since our military expedition in 1842 passed up to 
Natal, the Pondos came out of their hiding places, 
and pasturage being good in the country they were 
thus enabled to occupy, the few cattle they had 
preserved from the Zulus multiplied and increased 
rapidly, (28) 
In fact, the Mpondo recovery began well before this date and their growing herds 
resulted from their initiatives in trading and raiding rather than from mere natural 
increase. The fact that the coloq was prepared to give so much responsibility to Faku 
in the treaty of 1844 testifies to his power by the time the Coloqy advanced its 
treaty making activities to the area. Bmmlee did, however, aad one important 
comment. 
To the ordinary increase of their stock they added by 
the cultivation of tobacco, which they sold to the 
tribes which had not been spoiled by the Zulus for 
young cattle and goats. And Pondo tobacco became known 
and appreciated even to the borders of the Cape Colony. (29) 
All the chiefdoms settled along the coast produced tobacco (and dag@) which they used 
themselves - the Mpondo snuffed and the Xhosa smoked - and traded. However, Brownleevs 
idea of the rise of Mpondo production maJr not be entirely anachronistic. Tobacco was 
produced largely on the site of old cattle kraals; dung provided an ideal fertilizer. 
Thus the reincorporation of cattle and the movement back to old grazing lands my well 
have signalled the renaissance of tobacco growing, particularly if the Mpondo had 
preferred to concentrate on subsistence crops duri* the period of close settlement. 
Brownlee is correct that the Mpondo were well known as tobacco growers throwout the 
nineteenth century. (30) 
By 1861, a missionary complained that "from the pastoral life which these 
people lead, the population of the country is a good deal scatteredtt. (31) The new 
great place was situated away from any major river, near the 600 metre contour, in 
open country, but conveniently placed for access to winter grazing along the coast. 
Naam;Lse, Fakufs eldest son, soon returned to Western Pondoland; he acted with 
increasing independence, but remained subordinate to FaJm and, initially,to Faku9s 
successor in 1867, Mqikela. The Western Mpondo also spread out during the 1840s and 
1 8 5 0 ~ ~  and though some differences in the responses of the two areas developed - 
partly owing to differing climatic and ecological patterns, partly to their geographical 
location - both sections of the chieidom became primarily pastoralists. 
Not only were cattle stocks high eno- to provide adequate subsistence, but 
a sufficient surplus was accumulated for the Mpondo to participate in the lucrative 
cattle trade with the Cape and Natal. By 1860 a missionary commen.ted: 
We have much to try us in consequence of the worldly 
money getting spirit, which is now beginning to prevail 
more extensively in this part of the country. Many have 
large stocks of cattle, some are now engaged in trading. (32) 
Jenkins, Wesleyan missionary in the area from 1838 and perhaps the best informed 
observer of Mpondo affairs, commented to a visitor in 1866: 
Twenty five years ago not a cow or even a goat could be 
puchased at amy price in all Pondo-lad. I knew a 
trader who came with a wagon-load of goods for trade, 
and after spending five or six months, he b o w t  an 
inferior lot of calves to the value of £7/10/-, which 
the missionary had previously secured for his own family 
use. Now thousands of cattle are bought and sent out of 
the country annually . . . (33) ' 
Cattle were highly mobile, so the lack of roads in Pondoland did not gseatly inhibit 
the growth of the trade. The cattle price seems to have remained reasonably high 
and rose even higher a t  t h e s  of large demand i n  the ear ly 1870s, when the 
diamond f i e ld s  were opened, and i n  the l a t e  1870s when large colonial armies 
were present i n  the &stern Cape and Natal. The Mpondo ca t t l e  stocks benefited 
part icular ly from the Gcaleka and Mpondomise wars i n  the l a t e  1 8 7 0 ~ ~  as  both chiefdoms 
sent t h e i r  stock in to  Pondoland f o r  safe-keeping and found it d i f f i cu l t  t o  regain. (34) 
Pondoland also became the refuge of ca t t l e  thieves and rus t le rs  as  the colonial 
boundary advanced to  the north-east during the 1870s. (35) Cat t le  remained the key 
export u n t i l  about 1883, when Redwater, a c a t t l e  disease which had moved slowly down 
from Natal, made i ts impact on Mpondo herds. (36) Losses were not high, and the 
willingness to  trade was probably only temporarily affected. However, the Cape banned 
further imports from Pondoland i n  order to  stem the spread of the disease. The Natal 
market remined open, but traders i n  Pondoland slowed up t h e i r  export ac t iv i t i e s  fo r  
f ea r  of creating a glut.  Prices i n  Pondoland dropped as  demand f e l l .  The trade 
may have recovered but Rinderpest f i na l ly  k i l l ed  it i n  1897, 
Aside from ca t t l e ,  hides and horns were also important exports. Horns had 
l i t t l e  value on external markets - they fetched less  than a penny each i n  the ear ly 
1860s - but hides were worth from four t o  f ive  shi l l ings i n  Natal. (37) Hides were 
used both fo r  kaross and f o r  shield-making by the Mpondo, and t h e i r  ava i lab i l i ty  
depended both on the number of c a t t l e  slaughtered and the local  clothing needs. 
Hide exports probably reached a height during the, ear ly 1860s when lungsickness, 
another ca t t l e  disease, caused lfsevere losses" i n  the herds. (38) The Mpondo 
were fu l ly  aware of the threat  of the disease, which had affected herds i n  both 
the Cape and Natal during the 1850s. They organized guard posts on the wagon routes 
in to  Pondoland and refused entry t o  colonial ca t t le .  (39) Nevertheless, the disease 
did penetrate, and a surplus of hides resulted. It i s  interest ing to  note tha t  some 
Xhosa also responded quickly t o  the hide market when they l o s t  t h e i r  c a t t l e  i n  the 
c a t t l e  k i l l i ng  (1857). 
The kaf i r s  [brou&t] i n  the skins only of the s l a i n  
c a t t l e  t o  the traders. Every day and hour they 
thronged the s tores  with the reeking hides, a1wa;ys i n  
haste t o  return t o  fur ther  sacrifice....  We stood a t  
the t r ade r f s  s tore  often regarding the p i l e  of skins 
accumulating before the door, thrown down f o r  a mere 
song, a b i t  of tobacco, o r  an ornament, with just 
feelings of wonder and aadness. (40) 
Cattle diseases and c a t t l e  k i l l ings  cannot, however, explain the sustained hide trade, 
nor does it appear that the Mpondo acted i n  so uncommercial a s p i r i t .  I n  the early 
1860s the value of "a pairq1 of cotton blankets i n  Natal was from two to  three shi l l ings,  
and it may well be tha t  the Mpondo found it profitable t o  change t h e i r  clothing from 
karosses t o  blankets because of the favourable exchange they could obtain. (41) It i s  
a t  t h i s  time that Jenkins reports the recent increase i n  Yne use of blankets by the 
Mpondo. How long the price relationship between blankets and hides remained favourable 
t o  the Mpondo is a question f o r  f v t h e r  investigation, but,once blankets had become 
socially accepted, a reversion t o  karosses was unlikely. (42) 
Hides were exported overland and, notably, by sea through Port St Johns, the 
only harbour on the Pondoland, and indeed the Transkeian, coast a t  which ships called 
regularly. Ships operated from Durban, but only vessels with a shallow draught could 
use the port because of the sand-bar a t  the Mzimvubu mouth. Access to  the port from 
the in t e r io r  w a s  d i f f i cu l t  because of inadequate wagon routes, but traders mention 
loading 3,500 lbs  onto a wagon coming from the port. As hides were l i gh t  i n  re la t ion  
t o  t h e i r  value, a substaat ia l  cargo could be collected. Hides remained an important 
export well into the twentieth century, and it was the hide and c a t t l e  trade tha t  
brought permanently s e t t l ed  traders into Pondoland. By the 1860s there were a t  l ea s t  
four European traders and t h e i r  families s e t t l ed  near Port St Johns, and by the 1870s 
perhaps f i f t y  t o  s ix ty  traders i n  the whole of Pondoland. (43) 
The Mpondo were selective about the commodities they accepted i n  exchange 
f o r  t he i r  hides and ca t t le .  Beads, which had formerly been crucial i n  inter- and 
intra-chiefdom exchange, seem t o  have become l e s s  valuable by the 1860s, and although 
they were s t i l l  important f o r  decorative purposes they do not seem t o  have been the 
major import. Aside from blankets, liquor, a few omamen-ts and articles of 
consumption such as su.cr'{~i'i? m d  salt, the major imports were firearms, metal goods 
agzicul twal implements) and horses. (44) 
From the 1850s it becane increasingly important for the Mpondo to arm 
themselves as %he sumunding chiefdoms, particularly those closer to Lhe Cape Colony, 
had already begm to use guns for offensive and defensive purposes. Initially, it 
was pmbably the chiefs who obtained ~trms,as the price was high. tqFor a gun which 
cost a trades from E5 t o  E6 [in 18611 he gets six lare oxen lin Pondolmd 
specifically] at the very least worth 64.0." (45) But, in view of the lucrative 
pickings to be made in the fi.ma?nsls trade, Cape and Natal traders stepped up 
acthities both overland and thrau& Port St Johns. They could afford to bribe the 
police employed to curtail the trade. In 1864 a Natal source estimated that one 
qmter of the Mpondo had firearm. (46) The figure, which would indicate about 
5,000 guns in  the area, is probably a settler exaggeration, but there is no doubt 
that the iQondo were formidably armed. (47) By the late 1 8 7 0 ~ ~  the Mpondo had guns 
qlrrmch superior to ary that they previously possessedl',and "almost all the whole of the 
breach loadin& rifles formerly possessed by the Gcalekas, Tembus and Pondomise ... 
passed by excliz- or barter into the hands of the Pondos" a few years Later. (48) 
In 1884 Mhlangaso, adviser to Mgikela, was amanging a large import of Snider rifles 
f r o m  Gemany, and,thou& the deal fell throu&,some Snider and Hemy Martini rifles - 
the latter stolen from colonial magazines - probably found their way into 
Pondolsmd. (49) Gunpowder was locally manufactured from sulphur and saltpetre brought 
in by the traders> and runaway Europeans helped with repairs. (50) 
Firearms hastened the extinction of game, but were more i~postant for 
militaq purposes. Ironically, Mpondo raiding expeditions were far less successful 
after the introduction of a m .  In a famous battle in 1866, the arrqy panicked in the 
face of the numerically inferior 3aca; and the Mpbndo'are reported to have lost 700 
firearms aniE hunbds killed. (51) The incorporation of cattle seems to have been 
accoapanied by a change in the nature of raiding activities. Land hunger replaced 
cattle hmger,and the Epondo do seem to have had some limited success in driving back 
the Baca, Xesibe and Mpondomise, though they did not conquer them. In the 1870s the 
Colony extended its authority over most of the surrounding chiefdoms and fixed -the 
Mpondo boundary. Border skirmishes continued, but the threat of colonial intervention 
checked major Mpondo expeditions. When they did threaten agpssion in the early 
1880s, the Colony rearmed the surrounding chiefdoms and brought its forces onto the 
border. The Mpondo would not risk a major confrontation, not least because the Baca 
and Xesibe were keen to have the opportunity of carrying off the Xpondo herds as 
spoil. Thus, while firearas were largely ineffective in raiding and expansion, they 
were important in the defence of Mpondo land and herds and were probably a major 
factor in the maintenance of Mpondo independence. 
The incorporation of horses into Pondoland pmbably followed the same pattern 
as that of firearms; they were initially chiefly luxuries, but by the 1880s had become 
more general. By L880 there were mxqjhly 4,000 in the area. (52) Horses were used 
exclusively for fighting and personal transport. Sheep were also introduced, 
particularly in areas away from the coast, but wool production remained insignificant 
in the nineteenth century.. Information on goats and pigs is sparse; the holdings in 
both probably increased. l 
The importation of wicultural implements seems to have taken place in two 
phases. In 1866 Jenkins maintained that 
the wooden spade was formerly the only instrument used in 
tilling the ground; but now, within a very recent period, 
a single house in Hatal sold twenty thousand hoes and picks 
to the Pondos, besides man;y ploughs and a few mgans. (53) 
The inlmduction of ploughs was,initlally, fairly gcadua.1. In l874 there was an 
eatbated one plough to every twenty homesteads (54), but in 1880 the British 
resident in Poadolmd commented: 
A very noticeable change is taking place in the 
Pondo system of agriculture. The pick, which some 
20 years ago superseded the old wooden spade, is 
now rapidly being displaced by the plou&. Upwasds 
of 500 new ploughs were brought into use by the 
Pondos for this season@s planting. (55) 
By l880 there were 1,100 ploughs i n  the area; but it was only after that date that 
plough imports really took off, ~e numbers reaching over 8000 by 1904. 
There a m  some problems in explaining why the Mpondo adopted new technology 
firstly in the early 1860s and secondly in the early 1880s. Hoes and ploughs were 
used by chiefdoms to the south-west and west (including the Sotho) well before they 
were, introduced into Pondoland, thus unavailability cannot explain the late date of 
innovation in Pondoland,nor availability the precise date of introduction. 
Innovation was not, initially, related to the availability of colonial mlcets. In 
1865 Jenkins mentioned that "there is no sale for it [maize] save in our own family 
and it will not pay traders as land carriage is too far and expensive". (56) The 
value of maize that could be loaded on to a wagon - possibly around g5 - compared 
unfavourably with the value of a load of hides. There are few reports of gTain 
exports until the late 1870s. Hoe purchase must thus be related to a desire to invest 
the surplus from the hide cwd cattle trade usefuily, to maximize the producLs of labour 
in cultivation, and to increase local consumption, The purchase of ploughs in the 
early l880s, on the other hand, is probably directly related to market opportunities 
aa by that date transport problems had been solved and "grain wakl usually exported 
in large quantities". (57) 
Both periods of innovation coincided with cattle diseases. After the ShakeLn 
raids and Rinderpest, the Mpondo were very @ck to put more effort into cultivation 
in order to supply subsistence needs m d  to buy back cattle with the surplus. 
Similar responses mqr well have followed the outbreaks of Lungsickness and Kedwater. 
In the latter case, cattle losses were not high, but the loss of cattle maskets ma;y 
have hastened the development of grain production in order to provide a saleable 
surplus* to exchange for imported commodities which had become tlnecessaryl' items of 
consumption. The relationship between cattle diseaaes and cultivation was complex 
and became more so when the plough and ox-wagon (used for transport of goods) were 
introduced. Although it is possible to fix some dates for major epidemics. both 
Lungsickness and Redwater, and a number of other tliseases, became endemic a.nd minor 
epidemics recurred constantly. In the long run, markets and increased reliance on 
pain for subsistence were probably more important factors in stirmnlating innovation 
than any specific cattle disease. 
Grain export implied a more thorough link with the colonial economy than did 
the cattle trade. Surplus cattle resulted from local breeding and natural increase, 
while imported technology was necessary for the production of surplus pain. Grain 
was also more difficult to transport, and export necessitated a greater inveobnent in 
the infrastructure of trade. It is from the 1880s that the features of dependence 
become cleaxly recognizable in Pondoland: dependence on colonial markets to realize 
the capital which was necessary for further investment into cultivation on which 
continued surplus depended; and dependence on the colonial and metropolitan economies 
both for &icles of consumption and capital goods. At this stage, few Mpondo migrated 
to colonial labour centres; thus innovation cannot be explained by a desire to offset 
the loss of male labour, nor by a desire to invest wages. It seems that the wondo 
were one of the last chiefdoms to be absorbed into labour migramcy. Some, perhaps, 
went to the diamond fields, but it should be remembered that firearm, a major 
attraction at IUmberley, were supplied by local traders and smugglers, 
It remaim to pose some questions and offer some very tentative suggestions 
about the effect of changing production and contact with colonial markets on social 
ormzation and the political. structure of the chiefdom. The polity was based around 
a core group of the Mpondo proper, who were distinguishable, At least in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, by their dress (particularly their head dress) and 
customs. (58) Within this unit, there were a number of sub-chiefdoms, usually under 
the authority of a member of the Mpondo royal lineage. In addition, after the 1820s, 
refugee groups, mainly from Natal, settled in Pondoland under the authority of the 
pmamount. Incorporation involved both large groups, such as the Tshangase, Ngutyana, 
Zizi and Nci, with their own recognized leaders who became tributary to Faku, and 
individuals and smaller groups who were absorbed into the Qondo proper. The degree 
of incorporation varied: the Baca became tributary to Faku in the 1830s but renounced 
the relationship in the 1840s; the Xesibe also asserted their independence after a 
tributaxy period. Mpondo boundaries were fluid till the time of colonial annexations 
a.nd tribute relationships were a matter of continual dispute. Subordhate cstatus was 
indicated by the payment of cattle to the paramount, recognition of his court, 
p&icipation in his councils and feaats, and the williwess to serve in his amay. 
Within each sub-chiefdom, there was also a hierarchy of authority. Expressed 
simplistical~y, the relationship between chiefs and people involved, on the economic 
level, extraction of mods and services on the part of the chiefs, who in turn 
controlled the distribution of land and were to some extent responsible for providing 
subsistence in times of need, holding feasts and distributing cattle. 
There is no specific information on how agricultural production was organi- zed 
during the time of close settlement. Male labour me;y have been incorporated at the 
level of the individual homestead, but it is possible that, as in Zululand, male 
regiments were used for agricultural tasks during the intervals between raids and 
hunts. Arrny organization was probably at its heigbt during this period and the Mpondo 
were dependent for their economic regeneration on the success of their armies. Close 
settlement, originally a defensive response, probably facilitated the gathering and 
control of large armies for aggressive purposes. Military organization was, 
according to tradition, within the unit of the sub-chiefdom rather than the chiefdom 
as a whole, but close settlement must have placed severe constraints on individual 
action. Close settlement may well have provided the basis for developments in 
organization which resembled those of the "confederation" period in Zululand, but 
there is no evidence of military kraals. The Mpondo were the only "Cape Nguni" 
chiefdom to abolish circumcision, and although the reasons for abolition are unclear 
the decision may have indicated a tighter aray organization than among the Xhosa, if 
the Zulu experience is used as an indicator. (59) 
Despite the general poverty after the Zulu raids, Faku 
appeared to be receiving contributions from some of 
his people, as [Dundas] observed several poor 
creatures bring to a heap of corn small baskets of 
that grain and silently throw it down. (60) 
If regimental labour was used on the lands, Faku probably controlled the surplus, and 
it is possible that some of the immigrants became, initially, servants to the Hpondo 
chiefs. Agricultural production was highest on the lands of the chiefs, asld their 
ability to levy tribute secured their privileged economic position. It is unlikely 
that the chiefs themselves worked on the lands. In 1831 Boyce, the first missionary, 
noted: 
there is now plenty of food in the land, but the 
improvident natives are wasting immense quantities 
of corn, in the manufacture of beer, so that in a 
few months distress will again be experienced 
paxtiall. by all classes of society, and severely 
by the poor dependants of the great men who will be 
driven to seek a scanty subsistence by digging roots 
in the vacant country between the Umgazi and Umtata. 
The chiefs and influential men are foremoat in every 
species of excess . .. C~is italics] (61) 
The control of the spoils acquired in hunting and raiding, and the trade 
resulting from the former activity, is problematic. The army had to be doctored by 
the psramount at the Great Place before expeditions, thus Faku certainly could 
instigate or prevent major army activities. It seems he was responsible for the 
distribution of cattle among the sub-chiefdorns after raids, and took a substantial 
share for himself, but there is nothing to indicate that he had a monopoly of incoming 
cattle. How the size of his share varied over the is unclear. 
Small gdme was, according to traditions collected by Hunter, hunted by 
individuals or small groups of men who needed no chiefly doctoring and could keep the 
spoils themselves. (62) Bowever, IIunter, whose field work was conducted in the early 
19308, probably reflected the knowledge of men who had been born well after the period 
of close settlement, and evidence suggests that there was some chiefly control over 
small @me at that time, 
Among the Arnaponda where game is scarce, owing to the 
dense population, certain restrictions are enforced, 
and men of influential property claim the right of 
hunting in particular forests, allowing no intrusion 
without their permiss ion being obtained. (63) 
This statement referred to the area of close settlement itself. But over the Mzimvubu, 
where game was plentiful: 
Laws of peat severity have ... been enacted, and 
scrupulously administered, to protect this now 
important branch of trade [the blue buckskin trade]; 
and the various chiefs have respectively assumed a 
landed proprietorship over several districts, which 
they either hunt in themselves, or let out at hi& 
prices for determinate periods to parties of native 
adventurers, thus creating a novel and lucrative 
source of wealth to repair their previous losses. (64) 
Chiefly control of small game hunting probably fell off in the later nineteenth 
century, when the buckskin trade collapsed. 
Hunter reports that the hunting of big game was sometimes organized by the 
paramount. If so, the spoils were bm-t to the Great Place after the hunt. 
Apparently, however, the paramount had the right to all tusks. (65) Fynn, in his 
description of a Etusi elephant hunt in the 18208, mentioned that the tusks went to 
the thrower of the first assegai, and the hunt seems to have involved only one sub- 
chiefdom. (66) Ba,inls journal, referring to the year 1829, also suggests that hunting 
and trading of ivory in Pondoland took place without pamount control. (67) 
However, Fynnrs evidence should not be used to prove that the southern Ngwni paranounts 
did not control their ivory trade. Firstly, each Xhosa-speaking chiefdom should be 
differentiated as developments often varied. Secondly, both Fynn and Bain visited 
Pondoland at a time when the Mpondo polity had recently been shattered, and,althow 
the Ntusi were "part of the Amapondo nation", they may have been able to hunt and 
trade independently in the 1820s. (68) Faku may well have had control over the ivory 
trade before the 18208, or cornered control in the 1830s, although there is no 
evidence besides the tradition to support this view. Control over hunting lands 
probably indicates some chiefly stake in the ivory trade, and the "Bushman" ivory 
trade was possibly absorbed into a tribute relationship under the paraaount. If the 
paramount did succeed in cornering the trade, the position may have been disturbed 
by the arrival of white hunters who, both in Zululand and Pondoland, appear to have 
had a free hand on payment of a small gift to the paramount. 
The period of close settlement, raiding and hunting saw the development of 
a polity more g;eographically and politically centralized than that of the more 
southerly Xhos+speaking groups. Faku "governed a people composed of fragments of 
many different tribes ... held together and harmonized in a surprising manner by his 
influence1'. (69) He was more "despotic" than the chiefdoms to the south. (70) 
In many respects Faku differs from the Caffer chiefs. 
His authority is less limited, and he decides on 
matters of business chiefly on his own responsibility. (71) 
The Mpondo experience in the earlier half of the nineteenth century seems to have 
been remarkably similw to that of the other states on the periphery of the Zulu 
empire. 
The reincorporation of cattle into the economy did not necessarily result 
in an immediate weakening of paramount authority,for cattle were a crucial element in 
binding the chiefdom together through tributes and loans. However, unless the Mpondo 
paramount developed a monopoly over incoming cattle, which is unlikely, reincorporation 
and the spreading out of the population probably initiated the period of political 
decentralization. Theal argues that the colonial. grant of £75 a year given to Faku 
in the 1844 treaty "enabled him in the course of a few years to become the owner of 
enormous herds of cattle". (72) But £75 would not have gone very far when the numbers 
involved were in the 1000s or 10,000s. 
The paramount does seem initially to have developed some control over the 
activities of traders coming into Pondoland. A levy of £15 or £20 was exacted from 
ships calling at Port St Johns (731, and settled traders had to pay 25-to the 
I paramount and probably a consideration to the local chief. (74) However, traders 
I themselves were responsible for export activities, and,after paying tribute to the paramount, seem to have had a free hand in purchase. The chiefs, as the largest 
l 
owners of cattle, undoubtedly derived the greatest benefit from the cattle and hide 
I trade, but there is no evidence to suggest that they alone participated. 
In 1861, the Colonial authorities were of the opinion that, despite the 
increasing independence of Ndamase, the Mpondo anqy could aot as a coherent unit. 
( ~ t  hat date the twoy was estimated at 20,000, and the Mpondo probably rivalled the 
Sotho and Pedi as the second largest chiefdom in South Africa. The Thembu anny 
numbered about 5,000, and the recently weakened Gcaleka 3,000.) (75) But by 1880 
the colony had recognized Nqwiliso, Ndamase's successor, as an independent paramount 
in Western Pondoland, and reports suggest that Mqikela could not count on the support 
of a few of his important sub-chiefs. (76) Within a decade, civil war had broken out 
in both Eastern and Western Pondoland. The collapse of the paramountcy, and the 
political cohesion of the chiefdom, was a complex process not unrelated to Mqikelafs 
personal incapacity and his predilection for "the vilest compounds imaginable that 
[found] their w q  into Pondoland under the name of Cape Brandyt1. (77) Colonial 
machinations, the widespread acquisition of firearms,& conflict over how to deal 
with the colonial threat, no doubt also played a part. H o w ~ Q ~ ~ ,  in conclusion, an 
attempt will be made to relate political disintegration to the paramountfs economic 
position. 
By the 1 8 8 0 ~ ~  the paramount had probably lost control of outgoing and in- 
coming trade. Control of outgoing trade, as Terray has pointed out, must be related 
to control of surplus. (78) In reference to the 1870s and 1880s, Monica Wilsonfs 
general suggestion "that among the Sotho a chief controlled relatively more of the 
stock than among the Nguni where ownership was more widely distributed" is probably 
supportable, altho* the statement may not reflect the position of Pondoland in the 
first half of the nineteenth century accurately. (79) The renewed importance of grain 
as an export commodity weakened paramount control of surplus further. Production at 
the paramount's homestead was probably highest, and there was probably some form of 
c o ~ l  labour on the paramount's fields. He and the other chiefs were likely to 
have been the first purchasers of ploughs, and as early as 1856 a colonial settlement 
in cattle with the Xpondo "included at the request of two of Faku's sons [two sets] 
of trained wagon oxen . . . as they were about to get wagons". (80) However, grain 
production was localized within each homestead, tribute in grain was difficult to levy 
in laxge quantities, and each producer entered into a separate relationship with 
Eumpean traders, who by the 1880s were spread throughout the area and probably took 
m h  of the surplus. Local chiefs rather than the paramounts were likely to have 
benefited from the increase in grain production. 
With the extermination of big game and the limitations on raiding, the aj5.w 
ceased to be used as an instrument of acquisition. Traders were responsible for 
bringing in the new imports over the manufacture of which the paramount had no control. 
There is evidence that Mqikela did try to control imports of liquor and to limit the 
activities of traders in Pondold, by giving a monopoly to one firm. (81) But his 
efforts seem to have met with failure, as did his attempts to levy a tax on wagons 
passing through Pondoland (1885) and to open a new port on the Pondoland coast (port 
~rosvenor) when the Cape finally annexed Port St Johns in 1884. (82) Port Grosvenor 
flourished for a couple of years and took some of the trade away from Port St Johns, 
but the Cape, partly to retrieve customs revenue and partly to forestall the attempt 
to import German guns, declared its authority over the whole Pondoland coast in 1885, 
and Port Grosvenor closed down soon afterwards. (83) The paramountl s personal income 
was assured through various colonial grants, and, in addition to dues from the traders, 
he received income from some small land and mineral concessions. However, there is 
evidence that his ability to levy tribute declined in the 1880s, when there was a 
general reluctance on the part of the chiefs to contribute to levies for a deputation 
to Ehg1a;nd and for the purchase of German guns. The reluctance m a y  have been 
associated with the losses caused by Redwater and political opposition to those 
specific projects which were initiated by Mhlangaso and his white advisers rather than 
Mqikela himself. But there is no doubt that flMqikelaqs hold over his people [was] 
weak and ever decreasingff and that qfmore power [had] fallen into the hands of 
subordinate tribal chiefs than is usual in Native tribesft. (84) Some important su'b-chiefs 
stayed away from his councils and would not even participate in his feasts. (85) 
Lastly, changes in the nature of local production probably also affected 
the relationship between chiefs and people. Economic dependence and the increasing 
importance of cultivation suggest that productive activities were atomized to the 
level of the homestead and that even the local chiefs were displaced in some of their 
crucial economic activities by the traders. An attempt to chart this process 
chronologically is impossible at present, and there are many variables which would 
affect such an argument; the changing organization, for example, of comnmal work 
parties, which,Hunter noted, were more active in "more conservative districtsf1, is of 
vital importance. (86) The process is likely to have become more rapid in the 
twentieth century, although the chiefs, through using their position in the colonial 
administrative structure, seem to have been able to offset such developments to some 
extent. 
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